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Abstract
Two-Stage Exponential (TSE) discounting, the model developed here, gen-
eralises exponential discounting in a parsimonious way. It can be seen as an
extension of Quasi-Hyperbolic discounting to continuous time. A TSE dis-
counter has a constant rate of time preference before and after some threshold
time; the switch point. If the switch point is expressed in calendar time, TSE
discounting captures time consistent behaviour. If it is expressed in waiting
time, TSE discounting captures time invariant behaviour. We provide prefer-
ence foundations for all cases, showing how the switch point is derived endoge-
nously from behaviour. We apply each case to Rubinstein’s infinite-horizon,
alternating-offers bargaining model.
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A decision maker’s rate of time preference is reflected in a variety of behaviours:
smoothing consumption through saving, consuming or abstaining from tobacco,
drugs or unhealthy food, investing in education, and so on. A constant rate of
time preference, the predominant model of intertemporal choice in economics, rules
out sudden changes in behaviour. Yet, people commonly resolve to start saving, quit
smoking, eat better, and start exercising at some predetermined date. If utility is
unchanged, it seems that their discount rate abruptly changes. This paper studies a
model capturing this sudden change.
The Quasi-Hyperbolic (QH) discounting model elegantly captures a changing dis-
count rate (Phelps and Pollak, 1968; Laibson, 1997; Hayashi, 2003; Attema, Ble-
ichrodt, Rohde and Wakker, 2010; Olea and Strzalecki, 2013). Developed in discrete
time, QH discounting involves weighting utility for outcomes using discount factors{1, γβ, γβ2, . . .}. QH discounting has been applied extensively in economic theory
(Asheim, 1997; Laibson, 1997; Barro, 1999; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2001; Luttmer
and Mariotti, 2003). Extending QH discounting to continuous time is important for
economic applications. One approach has been considered by Harris and Laibson
(2013). This paper studies an extension of QH discounting called Two-Stage Expo-
nential (TSE) discounting. TSE discounting provides a more robust, in a way we
will describe, approach to modelling present-biased preferences.
As with exponential, and many other nonexponential discounting models (see Ab-
dellaoui, Attema and Bleichrodt, 2010: 849), TSE discounting retains a stationary
instant utility for outcomes. This utility is discounted by a constant rate of time
preference up to a switch point. After this point, the discount rate may change, but
then remains constant. Violations of constant discounting occur only when com-
paring the near and distant future. This parametric form of discounting was first
presented by Jamison and Jamison (2011). We provide a preference foundation for
TSE discounting over timed outcomes.
We extend TSE discounting to dynamic choice by developing time consistent and
time invariant (Halevy, 2012) versions of the model. It turns out that whether the
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model captures time consistent or time invariant behaviour depends only on the
interpretation of one parameter, the switch point. If the switch point is expressed
in calendar time, then the model is time consistent. If it is expressed in waiting
time, then the model is time invariant. We apply each dynamic version of TSE
discounting to the infinite-horizon, alternating-offers bargaining model of Rubinstein
(1982). There are few previous studies of non-exponential discounting preferences in
sequential bargaining (Akin, 2007; Ok and Masatlioglu, 2007; Noor, 2011; Kodritsch,
2012), all of which have assumed time invariance.
The outline of this paper is as follows: Section 1 contains the notation and definitions.
Section 2 presents the exponential discounting model, 2.1 as applied to static choice
and 2.2 as applied to dynamic decision making. In Section 3.1 we present the TSE
discounting model and in Section 3.2 we give a preference foundation for the model.
Section 4 then considers extensions of the TSE discounting model to dynamic choice.
The time consistent version of the model is presented in Section 4.1 and preference
foundations are given. The time invariant version of the model is presented in Section
4.2 and, again, preference foundations are given. Then, the models are applied to
infinite-horizon, alternating-offers bargaining in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. All proofs are
in the Appendices.
1 Definitions
Let [0,X], with X > 0, denote the set of outcomes and [0, T ], with T > 0, be the set
of times at which an outcome can occur. The set of timed outcomes is [0,X]×[0, T ].
A typical element of [0,X] × [0, T ] is (x, t), which denotes the outcome x being
received at time t. Such timed outcomes are the objects of choice.
A static preference relation ≽t is a binary relation defined over [0,X] × [t, T ]; the
set of timed outcomes occurring no sooner than time t. A static preference relation
characterises the preferences of our decision maker at time t, as if they were making
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decisions at that time.1 An initial preference relation ≽0 is a static preference relation
for t = 0. For a set of decision times D ⊆ [0, T ] with 0 ∈ D , a dynamic preference
structure R ∶= {≽t}t∈D is a set of static preference relations indexed by D .
Given a static preference ≽t, the relations ≻t, ≼t, ≺t and ∼t are defined in the usual
way. A static preference ≽t is complete if, for all (x, t), (x′, t′) ∈ [0,X] × [t, T ],
at least one of (x, t) ≽t (x′, t′) or (x′, t′) ≽t (x, t) holds. It is transitive if, for all(x, t), (x′, t′), (x′′, t′′) ∈ [0,X] × [t, T ], (x, t) ≽t (x′, t′) and (x′, t′) ≽t (x′′, t′′) jointly
imply (x, t) ≽t (x′′, t′′). It is a weak order if it is complete and transitive. It is
monotonic if, for all (x, t), (x′, t) ∈ [0,X] × [t, T ], (x, t) ≽t (x′, t) iff x ⩾ x′. It is
impatient if, for all (x, t), (x, t′) ∈ [0,X] × [t, T ], (x, t) ≽t (x, t′) iff t′ ⩾ t. We will
always assume that (0, t) ∼t (0, t′), for all t, t′ ∈ [0, T ], and include this condition in
the definition of impatience. A static preference relation ≽t is continuous if, for all(x, t) ∈ [0,X]×[t, T ], the sets {(x′, t′) ∶ (x, t) ≽t (x′, t′)} and {(x′, t′) ∶ (x, t) ≼t (x′, t′)}
are closed subsets of [0,X] × [t, T ].
A static preference relation ≽t is represented by a real-valued function Vt ∶ [0,X] ×[t, T ]→ R if, for all (x, t), (x′, t′) ∈ [0,X] × [t, T ], the following holds:
(x, t) ≽t (x′, t′) ⇔ Vt(x, t) ⩾ Vt(x′, t′).
A necessary condition for ≽t to admit such a representation is that ≽t is a weak order.
By Debreu (1964), weak ordering and continuity of ≽t are necessary and sufficient for
the existence of a continuous utility representation. Monotonicity and impatience
ensure that such a representation is non-decreasing in x and non-increasing in t.
We call a set of functions V ∶= {Vt}t∈D , where Vt ∶ [0,X]× [t, T ]→ R for each t ∈ D , a
dynamic model. Finally, we say that a dynamic preference structure R is represented
by a dynamic model V if, for all t ∈ D , the preference relation ≽t∈ R is represented
by Vt ∈ V .
1We underline the decision time, t, as it becomes useful in presenting what follows.
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2 Exponential Discounting
2.1 Static Choice and Exponential Discounting
This section reviews the classical exponential discounting model, as applied to initial
or static choice over timed outcomes. Initial preferences conform to exponential
discounting if they can be represented as follows:
V0(x, t) = δtu(x)
for all (x, t) ∈ [0,X] × [0, T ], with δ ∈ [0,1] and u ∶ [0,X] → R a continuous, strictly
increasing function with u(0) = 0. The uniqueness properties pertaining to this
representation are discussed later. The key property of exponential discounting is
stationarity :
Definition (Stationarity): A static preference relation ≽t satisfies stationarity if
for all (x, t), (y, t + τ), (x, s), (y, s + τ) ∈ [0,X] × [t, T ] the following holds:
(x, t) ≽t (y, t + τ) ⇔ (x, s) ≽t (y, s + τ).
The stationarity axiom asserts that a decision maker’s preferences are unaffected
by translations that preserve the time distance between two timed outcomes. This
formulation of stationarity is due to Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982). Koopmans
(1960, 1972) formulated the condition for sequences of outcomes. The following
result, characterising exponential discounting preferences for timed outcomes, is due
to Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982):
Theorem 2.1.1 (Fishburn & Rubinstein, 1982). The following statements are equiv-
alent:
(i) The initial preference relation ≽0 over [0,X]× [0, T ] is a continuous, monotonic
and impatient weak order that satisfies stationarity.
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(ii) The initial preference relation ≽0 over [0,X]×[0, T ] is represented by a function
V0 such that,
V0(x, t) = δtu(x)
for some δ ∈ [0,1] and u ∶ [0,X]→ R a continuous, strictly increasing function
with u(0) = 0.
The following uniqueness results hold for Theorem 2.1.1:
Proposition 2.1.2 (Uniqueness Results). Let the representation obtained in Theo-
rem 2.1.1 hold for some δ ∈ (0,1) and u. Then, δ and u are unique up to a joint
power σ > 0 and factor τ > 0 for u. That is, the map (x, t) ↦ γtv(x) represents ≽0,
if and only if γ = δσ and v = τuσ with σ, τ > 0 .
Note two important points regarding the above proposition. First, since the discount
factor δ is not unique, one cannot assign behavioural content to its magnitude. For a
discussion of the interpretation of the model’s parameters, see Benoit and Ok (2007).
Second, this lack of uniqueness is due to the timed outcomes framework we are using.
For sequences of more than one non-zero outcome, one obtains uniqueness.
2.2 Dynamic Exponential Discounting
We now present the exponential discounting model as applied to dynamic choice. A
dynamic preference structure R conforms to dynamic exponential discounting if it is
represented by a dynamic model V where,
Vt(x, t) = δtu(x)
for all Vt ∈ V and (x, t) ∈ [0,X]×[t, T ], with δ ∈ [0,1] and u ∶ [0,X]→ R a continuous,
strictly increasing function with u(0) = 0. That is, every static preference relation≽t∈R is represented by exponential discounting. Further, they are all represented by
the same exponential discounting function. As all static preference relations ≽t∈R in
6
such a dynamic preference structure satisfy stationarity, we say the structure satisfies
stationarity.
Dynamic exponential discounting assumes that the discount factor δ and utility func-
tion u can be taken to be the same at every decision time. Stationarity does not
constrain the relationship between static preferences across different times. Some-
thing further is required. We consider two properties, time consistency and time
invariance. These are such that, adding either of them to stationarity is sufficient
for dynamic exponential discounting.
Time consistency requires that the decision maker’s static preference between two
timed outcomes does not depend on the decision time.
Axiom (Time Consistency): A dynamic preference structure R satisfies time
consistency if for all ≽t,≽t′∈R, (x, t), (y, s) ∈ [0,X]× [0, T ] such that t, t′ ⩽ min{t, s}:
(x, t) ≽t (y, s) ⇔ (x, t) ≽t′ (y, s).
Halevy (2012) used the term time invariance for the following condition:
Axiom (Time Invariance): A dynamic preference structure R satisfies time in-
variance if, for all ≽t,≽t+τ∈ R, (x, t), (y, s), (x, t + τ), (y, s + τ) ∈ [0,X] × [0, T ] such
that t ⩽ min{t, s} and τ ⩾ 0:
(x, t) ≽t (y, s) ⇔ (x, t + τ) ≽t+τ (y, s + τ).
Time invariance captures the behaviour of a decision maker who evaluates timed
outcomes in waiting time. That is, only the delay between the decision time and the
outcome time matters; not the calendar time of the outcome. Time invariant sets of
preference relations may fail to exhibit time consistency. The following theorem is
due to Halevy (2012).
Theorem 2.2.1 (Halevy, 2012). Let R ∶= {≽t}t∈D be a dynamic preference structure.
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Let D = [0, T ]. If R satisfies any two of stationarity, time consistency and time
invariance, then it satisfies the remaining condition.
Theorem 2.2.1 can be used to give various preference foundations for exponential
discounting in the dynamic framework. This is achieved by combining the usual
conditions with any two of the three conditions for R.
3 Two-Stage Exponential Discounting
3.1 The Two-Stage Exponential Discounting Model
Quasi-hyperbolic (QH), in its original, discrete-time formulation, involves weight-
ing utility for outcomes using discount factors {1, γβ, γβ2, . . .}. This paper is con-
cerned with extending QH discounting to continuous time. Two possible ways are
Split-Function Exponential (SFE) discounting and Two-Stage Exponential (TSE)
discounting. SFE discounting incorporates a discontinuity in the discount function.
TSE discounting incorporates a discontinuity in the discount factor. Harris and Laib-
son (2013) proposed SFE discounting and Jamison and Jamison (2011, p.40) advo-
cated SFE over TSE discounting. We will show in this Section that the behavioural
implications of TSE discounting are more natural than of SFE discounting.
A SFE discounter has initial preferences ≽0 over [0,X] × [0, T ] represented by V0 ∶[0,X] × [0, T ]→ R where,
V0(x, t) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩ β
tu(x) if t ⩽ λ
γβtu(x) if t > λ
for all (x, t) ∈ [0,X] × [0, T ], with λ ∈ [0, T ], β ∈ [0,1], γ ⩾ 0, and u ∶ [0,X] → R
a continuous, strictly increasing function with u(0) = 0. Under SFE discounting,
outcomes occurring after a subjective “present,” i.e. after [0, λ], are affected by a
fixed factor γ.
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Initial preferences are said to exhibit immediacy bias if there are x, y ∈ [0,X], τ ∈[0, T ] and ∆ > 0 such that (x,0) ≻0 (y,∆) and (x, τ) ≺0 (y, τ + ∆). The delay ∆,
for outcome y over x, becomes acceptable when the timed outcomes are translated
τ units into the future. Immediacy bias, often called present bias, formalises the
example of Thaler (1981), which suggests that one who prefers (one apple, 0) to
(two apples, 1 day), will often prefer (two apples, 366 days) to (one apple, 365 days).
Such preferences are incompatible with exponential discounting.
SFE discounting can explain Thaler’s (1981) immediacy bias example. To do so,
however, forces either λ ∈[0, 1], or λ ∈[365, 366] to hold. These are restrictive require-
ments. As such, SFE discounting cannot simultaneously explain minor adaptions of
immediacy bias. If λ ∈[0, 1], then immediacy bias with a front-end delay of anything
larger than one day cannot be explained. If λ ∈[365, 366], then immediacy bias with
translation τ less than 364 days, or greater than 366 days cannot be explained by
SFE discounting.
Two-Stage Exponential (TSE) discounting also incorporates subjectivity to the time
period called “present”. A TSE discounter has initial preferences ≽0 over [0,X] ×[0, T ] represented by V0 ∶ [0,X] × [0, T ]→ R where,
V0(x, t) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩ α
tu(x) if t ⩽ λ(α/β)λβtu(x) if t > λ
for all (x, t) ∈ [0,X] × [0, T ], with λ ∈ [0, T ], α,β ∈ [0,1] and u ∶ [0,X] → R a
continuous, strictly increasing function with u(0) = 0. We call λ the switch point. It
is a threshold, a demarcation point that separates periods before and after a change
in attitudes. When evaluating timed outcomes that occur before λ, the decision
maker maximises an exponential discounting function with discount factor α. For
timed outcomes occurring later than λ, the decision maker exponentially discounts
the same utility function, but uses discount factor β. The weight (α/β)λ ensures
that the evaluation function is continuous everywhere.
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We say that a TSE discounting function, with λ ∈ (0, T ), exhibits decreasing impa-
tience if α < β and increasing impatience if α > β. For TSE discounting to exhibit
immediacy bias, decreasing impatience is necessary. The switch point λ, however,
can be any time between today and ∆-from-today. Front-end delays of the immedi-
acy bias condition are simultaneously accommodated, as are changes in τ to shorter
or longer translations. If immediacy bias is adapted, keeping the earlier timed out-
comes before λ and the later timed outcomes are after λ, then TSE discounting with
decreasing impatience will not be contradicted.
3.2 A Preference Foundation
This section provides a preference foundation for the TSE discounting model. We
present our result in the framework of initial choice over timed-outcomes. Our ap-
proach allows the switch point to be detected from observed behaviour.2 First, two
concepts are introduced: stationarity-after-t and stationarity-before-t.
Definition (Stationarity-after-t): A preference relation ≽0 satisfies stationarity-
after-t if for all (x, t), (y, t + τ), (x, s), (y, s + τ) ∈ [0,X] × [0, T ] with τ > 0 and s > t,
the following holds:
(x, t) ≽0 (y, t + τ) ⇒ (x, s) ≽0 (y, s + τ).
Stationarity-after-t demands that, when comparing two timed outcomes with the
soonest outcome occurring at time t, preferences are invariant under translations
that put each outcome backward in time by the same amount. Note that it is a one
way implication; the preference regarding the earlier timed outcomes implying the
preference regarding the later timed outcomes. TSE discounting preferences satisfy
stationarity-after-t when t ⩾ λ.
2We avoid using “there exists” in our axiom. A similar technique was employed by Diecidue,
Schmidt and Zank (2009) to provide a preference foundation for an inverse-S shaped probability
weighting function.
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Definition (Stationarity-before-t): A preference relation ≽0 satisfies stationarity-
before-t if for all (x, t), (y, t − τ), (x, s), (y, s − τ) ∈ [0,X] × [0, T ] with 0 < τ < s < t,
the following holds:
(x, t) ≽0 (y, t − τ) ⇒ (x, s) ≽0 (y, s − τ).
When comparing two timed outcomes, with the latest outcome occurring at time t,
these preferences are invariant under translations that bring each outcome forward
in time by the same amount. One may also verify, by substitution of the preference
functional, that TSE discounting preferences satisfy stationarity-before-t when t ⩽ λ.
Suppose we observe a violation of stationarity-after-t for some t. For TSE discoun-
ters, this can only happen because their switch point is later than t. Such an observa-
tion tells us, when trying to detect the switch point, we do not need to look before t as
stationarity-before-t must hold. Analogously, a violation of stationarity-before-t′, for
some t′, confirms that the switch point is not later than t′. Then, stationarity-after-t′
must hold. Indeed, for all times t ∈ [0, T ], if one of these conditions does not hold,
the other necessarily holds. This is the content of the two-stage stationarity axiom:
Axiom (Two-Stage Stationarity): For all times t ∈ [0, T ], preferences ≽0 are
stationary-before-t, or stationary-after-t, or both.
Two-stage stationarity is not strong enough to ensure a time-independent utility
function for outcomes.3 We use the following condition, midpoint consistency :
3To see this, consider an initial preference represented by,
V0(x, t) = { αtu(x) if t ⩽ λφ(βtv(x)) if t > λ
with α,β ∈ (0,1), λ ∈ [0, T ], u ∶ [0,X] → R continuous and strictly increasing, and φ ∶ R → R a
continuous, strictly increasing function. Such preferences necessarily satisfy two-stage stationarity,
but need not be TSE discounting preferences. The stationarity axiom would ensure that we could
take φ as the identity function and that both u = v and α = β hold. Two-stage stationarity implies
none of this. Continuity of V0 does ensure that α
λu(x) = φ(βλv(x)) for all x ∈ [0,X], therefore the
utilities are ordinally equivalent. Beyond this, no more can be said.
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Axiom (Midpoint Consistency): An initial preference relation ≽0 satisfies mid-
point consistency (or “≽0 is midpoint consistent”) if, for all x, y, z ∈ [0,X] and
t, t′, s, s′ ∈ [0, T ], any three of the following indifferences imply the fourth:
(x, t) ∼0 (y, t′) (x, s) ∼0 (y, s′)(y, t) ∼0 (z, t′) (y, s) ∼0 (z, s′)
Midpoint consistency captures the idea that we may consistently measure utility
ratios. Further, these utility ratios should not depend on which points in time are
used. Ko¨bberling and Wakker (2003) presented such a condition. Similar techniques
are discussed in Baillon, Driesen and Wakker (2012). The following theorem provides
the preference foundation for the TSE discounting model:
Theorem 3.2.1. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) The initial preference relation ≽0 over [0,X]× [0, T ] is a continuous, monotonic,
impatient and midpoint consistent weak order that satisfies two-stage station-
arity.
(ii) The initial preference relation ≽0 over [0,X]×[0, T ] is represented by a function
V0 such that,
V0(x, t) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩ α
tu(x) if t ⩽ λ(α/β)λβtu(x) if t > λ
for some α,β ∈ [0,1], λ ∈ [0, T ] and a continuous, strictly increasing u ∶[0,X]→ R with u(0) = 0.
The following Proposition outlines the uniqueness results pertaining to Theorem
3.2.1. A switch point is meaningful if it is in (0, T ) and α ≠ β.
Proposition 3.2.2 (Uniqueness Results). Let the representation obtained in Theo-
rem 3.2.1 hold for some α,β ∈ (0,1), λ ∈ [0, T ] and u ∶ [0,X] → R. If a switch point
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is not meaningful, then λ ∈ {0, T} or α = β, so TSE discounting collapses to expo-
nential discounting and the uniqueness results expressed in Proposition 2.1.2 hold.
Now consider a meaningful switch point. In this case, the switch point is uniquely
determined. Then, α, β and u are unique up to a joint power σ > 0 and factor τ > 0
for u.
The proofs for Theorem 3.2.1 and Proposition 3.2.2 are in Appendices A.1 and A.2
respectively.
4 Dynamic TSE Discounting Models
When we consider dynamic preference structures, the distinction between calendar
and waiting time is important. If the switch point is a point in calendar time λ then,
eventually, it will pass. When this happens, TSE discounting collapses to exponential
discounting. Suppose, on the other hand, that the switch point is expressed in waiting
time. In this case, it remains λ units in the future at all decision times. Such a TSE
discounter will never become an exponential discounter. These two interpretations
lead to time consistent or time inconsistent models of dynamic choice. We will
consider these possibilities, calendar time and waiting time, in Sections 4.1 and 4.2
respectively. In Sections 5.1 and 5.2 we study how each of these interpretations
affects the application of TSE discounting to sequential bargaining.
4.1 Consistent TSE Discounting
This section presents a model we call consistent TSE discounting (CTSE). Suppose
that our decision maker has TSE discounting initial preferences, as in Theorem 3.2.1.
For a CTSE preference structure, we ask that the switch point be expressed in
calendar time. Formally, our decision maker is a CTSE maximiser if their dynamic
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preference structure R is represented by a dynamic model V where,
Vt(x, t) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩ α
tu(x) if t ⩽ λ(α/β)λβtu(x) if t > λ
for all Vt ∈ V and (x, t) ∈ [0,X]×[t, T ], with λ ∈ [0, T ], α,β ∈ [0,1] and u ∶ [0,X]→ R
a continuous, strictly increasing function with u(0) = 0. For CTSE representations,
α, β, λ and u do not vary with the decision time. Each Vt is the restriction of the
initial representing function V0 to timed outcomes occurring later than t. Since λ
is expressed in calendar time units, CTSE preference structures exhibit time consis-
tency.
Theorem 2.2.1 tells us that this model cannot satisfy time invariance without col-
lapsing to exponential discounting. We will now dispense with two-stage stationarity
and consider an axiom that applies to the dynamic preference structure. Our new
condition here is two-stage time invariance. We must first introduce the notions of
time-invariance-before-t and time-invariance-after-t. The former is as follows:
Definition (Time-Invariance-before-t): A dynamic preference structureR satis-
fies time-invariance-before-t if, for all (x, t′), (y, t′′), (x, t′−τ), (y, t′′−τ) ∈ [0,X]×[0, T ]
with 0 ⩽ τ ⩽ t < t′, t′′ ⩽ t, the following holds:
(x, t′) ≽t (y, t′′) ⇒ (x, t′ − τ) ≽t−τ (y, t′′ − τ).
Time-invariance-before-t of a dynamic preference structure asks that, if we observe
a preference between two outcomes with the latest occurring before time t, then the
preference does not change if we bring both outcomes and the decision time forward
in time by the same amount. Notice that this is a one-way implication; the later
preference implying the earlier. The analogous condition, time-invariance-after-t, is
defined as follows:
Definition (Time-Invariance-after-t): A dynamic preference structure R satis-
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fies time-invariance-after-t if, for all (x, t′), (y, t′′), (x, t′+τ), (y, t′′+τ) ∈ [0,X]×[0, T ]
with 0 ⩽ τ and t ⩽ t ⩽ t′, t′′, the following holds:
(x, t′) ≽t (y, t′′) ⇒ (x, t′ + τ) ≽t+τ (y, t′′ + τ).
Time-invariance-after-t of a dynamic preference structure asks that, if we observe a
preference between two outcomes with the earliest occurring after time t, then the
preference does not change if we delay both outcomes and the decision time by the
same amount.
Under CTSE discounting, preferences must satisfy time-invariance-before-λ and time-
invariance-after-λ. We need not know λ a priori. Our axiom is formulated such that
the existence of λ and the appropriate representation are implied. We offer the
following, two-stage time invariance:
Axiom (Two-Stage Time Invariance): For all times t ∈ [0, T ], the set of pref-
erence relations R satisfies time-invariance-before-t, or time-invariance-after-t, or
both.
Two-stage time invariance provides a testable condition that must hold for all t in[0, T ]. The following theorem asserts the equivalence of our previous axiom set, using
two-stage stationarity, and an axiom set using two-stage time invariance.
Theorem 4.1.1. Let the set of decision times D = [0, T ]. Then, the following
statements are equivalent:
(i) The initial preference relation ≽0 over [0,X]× [0, T ] is a continuous, monotonic,
impatient and midpoint consistent weak order that satisfies two-stage station-
arity and the set of preference relations R satisfies time consistency.
(ii) The initial preference relation ≽0 over [0,X]×[0, T ] is a continuous, monotonic,
impatient and midpoint consistent weak order and the set of preference relations
R satisfies time consistency and two-stage time invariance.
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(iii) Each preference relation ≽t∈R can be represented by a function Vt where:
Vt(x, t) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩ α
tu(x) if t ⩽ λ(α/β)λβtu(x) if t > λ
for some α,β ∈ [0,1], λ ∈ [0, T ] and a continuous, strictly increasing u ∶[0,X]→ R with u(0) = 0.
The uniqueness results pertaining to Theorem 4.1.1 are the same as those in Proposi-
tion 3.2.2, applied at each decision time. The proof of Theorem 4.1.1 is in Appendix
A.3.
4.2 Invariant TSE Discounting
This section presents our second dynamic model. We call this model invariant two-
stage discounting (ITSE). In this case, we think of the switch point as being expressed
in waiting time. Formally, our decision maker is an ITSE discounter if their dynamic
preference structure R is represented by a dynamic model V where,
Vt(x, t) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩ α
tu(x) if t ⩽ t + λ(α/β)t+λβtu(x) if t > t + λ
for all Vt ∈ V and (x, t) ∈ [0,X]×[t, T ], with λ ∈ [0, T ], α,β ∈ [0,1] and u ∶ [0,X]→ R
a continuous, strictly increasing function with u(0) = 0.
The main difference between ITSE and CTSE discounting is that the decision time t
now plays an important role. At each decision time, an ITSE discounter will evaluate
timed outcome (x, t) using discount factor α if t is less than λ units from the current
decision time (t ⩽ t + λ). They will use discount factor β if t is more than λ units in
front of the current decision time (t > t+λ). Such preferences are not time consistent
(unless α = β) because the evaluation of a timed outcome (x, t) changes with the
decision time. They are, however, time invariant.
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We may use time invariance, combined with our initial conditions for TSE discount-
ing, to characterise ITSE discounting. We will provide a foundation for ITSE dis-
counting, with the key axioms applying to the dynamic preference structure. We
introduce a relaxation of time consistency, two-stage time consistency, which per-
mits violations of time consistency only when comparing timed outcomes that are
subjectively far enough apart in time.
Before presenting our two-stage time consistency axiom, it is necessary to develop
two conditions: Time-consistency-within-t-from-now and time-consistency-beyond-t-
from-now. The former is as follows:
Definition (Time-consistency-within-t-from-now): A set of preference rela-
tionsR satisfies time-consistency-within-t-from-now if for all ≽t∈R and all (x, t), (y, t′) ∈[0,X] × [0, T ], with 0 ⩽ t ⩽ t′ ⩽ t, the following holds:
(x, t) ≽0 (y, t′) ⇒ (x, t) ≽t (y, t′).
Time-consistency-within-t-from-now of a dynamic preference structure demands that,
for timed outcomes occurring before t, initial preferences are not later reversed. The
initial preference relation ≽0 plays a key role in this axiom. Preference relations at
later points in time, ≽t with t ⩽ t, are forced to agree with the initial preference
relation. This is a one-way implication, with initially expressed preferences implying
the later ones.
ITSE discounting preference structures must satisfy time-consistency-within-t-from
now whenever t ⩽ λ. This condition need not hold for ITSE discounters when t > λ,
but in this case there is an analogous condition:
Definition (Time-consistency-beyond-t-from-now): A set of preference rela-
tions R satisfies time-consistency-beyond-t-from-now if for all ≽t∈ R and all (x, t +
t), (y, t′ + t) ∈ [0,X] × [0, T ] with t ⩽ t′ the following holds:
(x, t + t) ≽t (y, t′ + t) ⇒ (x, t + t) ≽0 (y, t′ + t).
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Time-consistency-beyond-t-from-now of a dynamic preference structure demands
that, for timed outcomes occurring no sooner than t after decision time t, preferences
expressed are respected by initial preferences. Again, it is a one-way implication with
the later preference implying the earlier, initial preference. Time-consistency-beyond-
t-from-now, when combined with time invariance, will be equivalent to stationarity-
after -t. The distance between decision time and the timed outcomes increases when
comparing the first and second preference expressions. That is, at time decision t
a timed outcome occurring at time t + t is “t-from-now”. As “now” becomes ear-
lier, back to time zero, the same timed outcome is beyond-t-from-now. Under time
invariance, the former preference implies (x, t) ≽0 (y, t′). We see that the implied
preference above completes the requirement for stationarity-after-t. We are now set
to define the characteristic axiom for ITSE discounting.
Axiom (Two-Stage Time Consistency): For all times t ∈ [0, T ], the set of pref-
erence relations R satisfies time-consistency-within-t-from-now, or time-consistency-
beyond-t-from-now, or both.
We have explained how time-consistency-beyond-t-from-now, under the assumption
of time invariance of R, is equivalent to stationarity-after-t. Under the same as-
sumptions, time-consistency-within-t-from-now of R can be shown to be equivalent
stationarity-before-t of R. Two-stage time consistency, although by itself completely
distinct from two-stage stationarity, must be equivalent to two-stage stationarity for
time invariant structures. This is summarised in the following theorem:
Theorem 4.2.1. Let the set of decision times D = [0, T ]. Then, the following
statements are equivalent:
(i) The initial preference relation ≽0 over [0,X]× [0, T ] is a continuous, monotonic,
impatient and midpoint consistent weak order that satisfies two-stage station-
arity and the set of preference relations R satisfies time invariance.
(ii) The initial preference relation ≽0 over [0,X]×[0, T ] is a continuous, monotonic,
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impatient and midpoint consistent weak order and the set of preference relations
R satisfies time invariance and two-stage time consistency.
(iii) Each preference relation ≽t∈R can be represented by a function Vt where:
Vt(x, t) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩ α
tu(x) if t ⩽ t + λ(α/β)t+λβtu(x) if t > t + λ
for some α,β ∈ [0,1], λ ∈ [0, T ] and a continuous, strictly increasing u ∶[0,X]→ R with u(0) = 0.
The uniqueness results pertaining to Theorem 4.2.1 are the same as those in Proposi-
tion 3.2.2, applied at each decision time. The proof of Theorem 4.2.1 is in Appendix
A.4.
5 Bargaining
This section gives an application of the CTSE and ITSE discounting models. For
this purpose, we consider the infinite-horizon alternating-offers bargaining model of
Rubinstein (1982). Rubinstein’s model provides clear predictions under exponential
discounting. The basic framework is highly adaptable and has been used widely in
economics.
The game G is as follows. There are two players, 1 and 2, and a surplus of (nor-
malised) size 1. The players have exponential discounting (ED) preferences with
linear utility, that is, an outcome of x at time t gives utility at time zero of δtix,
where δi ∈ (0,1) is player i’s discount factor. The players alternate in proposing and
considering offers regarding how the surplus should be divided. Player 1 proposes
first at t = 0 and player 2 may accept or reject the proposal. If player 2 accepts the
proposal, the game ends at that point and the payoffs are those specified in player
1’s offer. If player 2 rejects the proposal, the game continues to t = ∆ at which time
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the players’ previous roles are exchanged. The ∆ parameter is called the bargaining
delay. The friction caused by the bargaining delay, in particular the players’ aversion
to delayed payoffs, is central in Rubinstein’s analysis. The game continues, perhaps
indefinitely, with players 1 and 2 making offers at time k∆, for even and odd k
respectively. Indefinite disagreement yields zero payoffs for both players.
Rubinstein (1982) showed that G has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE).
The SPE prescribes an immediate agreement. At time 0, player 1 suggests x = 1−δ∆2
1−δ∆1 δ∆2
for himself and 1 − x for player 2, which player 2 accepts and the game ends.
5.1 CTSE Discounting in Bargaining
Suppose we take any infinite-horizon game where the players are CTSE discoun-
ters. Then eventually (that is, after the last of the players’ switch points) the game
will become an infinite-horizon game where each player has exponential discounting
preferences. One may then use existing results to find the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium (SPE) of this subgame. Then, one may find the SPE of the overall game
by: truncating the game at the latest switch point, assigning each player their (sub-)
SPE payoff instead, and then solving the truncated game by backward induction.
We apply this technique to bargaining.
Consider a game G′ that is the same as G, except that player 2 is a CTSE discounter
with λ = 1 and discount factors α,β ∈ (0,1). For simplicity, we let ∆ = 1. If the
game were to continue to t = 2, then the remaining game is a standard Rubinstein
bargaining model with player 1 as first mover. The game starting at t = 2 has
a unique SPE with payoffs ( 1−β1−δ1β , β(1−δ1)1−δ1β ). To solve the game G′ we construct a
truncated game G′(2) with the following structure. G′(2) is the same as G′ at times
0 and 1. If the game reaches t = 1 and player 1 rejects player 2’s offer, instead of
continuing to t = 2 the game ends and players 1 and 2 are assigned payoffs 1−β1−δ1β and
β(1−δ1)
1−δ1β , respectively.
A payoff profile (x,1 − x), paid immediately, occurs as a SPE of G′ if and only
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if it occurs as a SPE of G′(2). The truncated game G′(2) is solved by backward
induction. At t = 1, by standard arguments, player 2 should offer player 1 a share
of x1 = δ1 1−β1−δ1β . At t = 0 player 1 should offer player 2 a share of 1 − x0 = α(1 − x1)
implying x0 for himself. This is immediately accepted by player 2. The unique SPE
involves immediate agreement and payoffs (x0,1 − x0) where:
x0 = 1 − [δ1β + (1 − δ1)α]
1 − δ1β .
Notice that x0 = 1−δ21−δ1δ2 if and only if α = β = δ2. The agreement is still reached
immediately, however the SPE is different as the incentives to delay agreement are
different. The change in discount rate that occurs after player 2’s switch point affects
the SPE payoffs in a predictable way.
A well-known result in bargaining under exponential discounting is that, other things
being equal, greater impatience leads to worse equilibrium payoffs. One can construct
examples where the player who is more impatient at the time of agreement does
better. In such cases the player in question will, at some point, become less impatient
than his opponent. This fact must, therefore, be integrated into the determination of
the equilibrium payoffs, even though the equilibrium prescribes agreement without
delay.
5.2 ITSE Discounting in Bargaining
A time inconsistent decision maker has different preferences at different decision
times. Effectively, they are a different decision maker at each decision time. Although
the decision maker is a collection of selves, the “decision time self” decides how
to treat the other selves. Three strategies advanced in the literature are naive,
resolute and sophisticated choice (Blackorby, Nissen, Primont and Russell, 1973;
Hammond, 1976; Machina, 1989; McClennen, 1990; O’Donogue and Rabin, 2001;
Hey and Lotito, 2009; Hey and Panaccione, 2011). We address each of these as
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applied to ITSE discounting and sequential bargaining.
The naive approach to address time inconsistency is, essentially, to ignore it. That
is, the decision time self acts as if they are ignorant of the fact that their preferences
will change. In general, this leads to different outcomes to time consistent choice. In
the case of the Rubinstein bargaining game, however, the outcome will be as the time
consistent case. Since the naive subgame perfect equilibrium prescribes immediate
agreement, the players will never learn of their preferences changing.
A resolute decision maker (McClennen, 1990) achieves time consistent behaviour by
sticking to their initial plan, regardless of their evolving preferences. As with the
naive case, agreement occurs immediately, hence we need not appeal to any form of
commitment device. In this application, the difference between naive and resolute
choice is only the underlying reasoning. A naive decision maker does not know his
preferences will change; a resolute decision maker does not care.
The final case we consider is sophisticated choice. In this case, the time inconsistent
decision makers are fully aware of their future preferences, fully anticipate the optimal
choices of their future selves, and integrate these into their current strategy. We will
assume, for ease of exposition, that player 1 has exponential discounting preferences
and player 2 is a sophisticated, ITSE discounter.
We call a strategy profile a myopic equilibrium if there are no preferable single period
deviations. This solution concept is sophisticated, players recognise their changing
preferences. But, only single periods matter for the solution and, under time invari-
ance, attitudes to single period delays never change.
Suppose that the bargaining delay ∆ is larger than player 2’s λ. Then, every time
player 2 has to make a decision of accept or reject now, time invariance ensures they
must be using discount factor β. It must be that the myopic equilibrium is the same
if we construct a new game, replacing player 2 with an exponential discounter with
discount factor β. Alternatively, if the delay ∆ is smaller than λ, then the myopic
equilibrium of the game will be the same if we replace player 2 with an exponen-
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tial discounter with discount factor α. The myopic equilibrium strategies are those
prescribed by Rubinstein’s analysis, using one of the two discount factors, depend-
ing on the bargaining delay. The myopic equilibrium outcome involves immediate
agreement and payoffs (x0,1 − x0) where:
x0 = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1−α∆
1−δ∆α∆ if ∆ ⩽ λ
1−β∆
1−δ∆β∆ if ∆ > λ
The outcome in this case is sensitive to the specification of the game. In particular,
the payoffs do not vary continuously with the bargaining delay. There is a pronounced
jump in the equilibrium partition as ∆ becomes longer or shorter than the period
before the switch point.
It remains to justify the use of this solution concept for the bargaining game un-
der consideration. One can consider the bargaining game with sophisticated, time
inconsistent players as a game with an infinite number of players. Strotz-Pollak equi-
librium is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of that game. As such, Strotz-Pollak
equilibrium is the appropriate solution concept for sophisticated choice. For more
on Strotz-Pollak equilibrium, see Shefrin (1998). The myopic equilibrium strategies
form a Strotz-Pollak equilibrium here. Adhering to the strategy always guarantees
immediate agreement. Deviating in any single round leads to agreement in either
one or two rounds which is, at best, no better.
Although the myopic equilibrium is unique, and is a Strotz-Pollak equilibrium, there
may be other Strotz-Pollak equilibria. Theorem 4 of Kodritsch (2012) provides a
sufficient condition for the unique myopic equilibrium we derived to be the unique
Strotz-Pollak equilibrium of the bargaining game. A sufficient condition is a weak
present-bias condition, equivalent here to constant or decreasing impatience, α ⩽ β.
Increasing impatience allows for delayed agreement as an equilibrium. Intuitively, if
one expects one’s opponent to “lose his cool” after a disagreement, the strategic ad-
vantage for delay is apparent. Although it is not the predominant finding, increasing
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impatience has been observed in individual choice experiments (Attema, Bleichrodt,
Rohde and Wakker, 2010; Epper, Fehr-Duda and Bruhin, 2011; Takeuchi, 2011;
Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt and l’Haridon, 2013).
6 Concluding Comments
We have presented two-stage exponential (TSE) discounting, provided an axiomatic
foundation, extended it to the dynamic framework in two different ways, and in each
dynamic interpretation provided two different axiomatic foundations. These char-
acterisations provide simple, testable conditions (two-stage stationarity, two-stage
time consistency and two-stage time invariance) that merit empirical study. We
have demonstrated how CTSE and ITSE discounting can be applied to bargaining
theory, in particular to the case with time between bargaining rounds being a contin-
uous variable. We expect that TSE discounting will be useful for further applications
of intertemporal choice.
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A Appendices
A.1 Proof of Theorem 3.2.1
First suppose that the initial preference relation is represented as in statement (ii) of
the theorem. That this implies statement (i) is straightforward. Weak ordering, con-
tinuity, monotonicity and impatience are immediate. Define a function D ∶ [0, T ]→ R
such that D(t) = αt if t ⩽ λ and D(t) = (α/β)λβt if t > λ. For midpoint consistency,
suppose (for instance) that the first three indifferences of the condition hold. Under
statement (ii) this is equivalent to:
D(t)u(x) =D(t′)u(y) & D(t)u(y) =D(t′)u(z) & D(s)u(x) =D(s′)u(y)
First notice that, if one of x, y or z are zero, then they are all zero. In that case, the
condition holds, given our extended definition of impatience. Suppose one of x, y, z
is non-zero. As D(⋅) is positive and u strictly increasing, it follows that all x, y, z
must be positive. Therefore, u(x), u(y), u(z) > 0 holds. The first two equalities
jointly imply, u(x)/u(y) = u(y)/u(z) =D(t′)/D(t) ∶= µ. Given this, the third implies
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D(s′)/D(s) = µ. The equality D(s)u(y) = D(s′)u(z) follows immediately, as does
the equivalent, required, fourth indifference. The necessity of two-stage stationarity,
given statement (ii) is explained next. If λ is zero or T then all of the conditions
of two-stage stationarity hold at all times. Suppose λ ∈ (0, T ). Taking any time
t ∈ [0, T ], Stationarity-before-t holds whenever t ⩽ λ and stationarity-after-t holds
when t > λ. Both conditions hold at λ. This covers all cases, establishing two-stage
stationarity.
For the remaining part of the proof we assume statement (i) of the theorem and derive
statement (ii). We first outline some of the implications of two-stage stationarity.
Under weak ordering, and using the definitions of two-stage stationarity, if ≽0 satisfies
stationarity-after-t then it satisfies stationarity-after-t′ for any t′ > t. Similarly, if≽0 satisfies stationarity-before-t then it satisfies stationarity-before-t′ for any t′ < t.
We will now show that if stationarity-before-t and stationarity-after-t′ hold with
t > t′, then stationarity holds everywhere. To see this, suppose that the conditions
of the claim are true. The restriction of preferences to [0,X] × [0, t] satisfies all
the conditions of Theorem 2.1.1 and therefore admits an exponential discounting
representation. The same holds for preferences restricted to [0,X] × [t′, T ]. By the
uniqueness results attached to Fishburn and Rubinstein’s theorem, we can choose
the same δ for each case. Then, there will be a u such that (x, t) mapped to δtu(x)
represents preferences on [0,X] × [0, t], and a u˜ such that (x, t) mapped to δtu˜(x)
represents on [0,X]× [t′, T ]. By assumption, there is a set [0,X]× [t′, t] where both
functions must represent preferences, hence they can be chosen to be equal. Then,
preferences over the whole set of timed outcomes admit one exponential discounting
representation, and stationarity must necessarily hold everywhere.
We now show the existence of λ. Firstly, if the initial preference relation is stationary,
then we may choose either λ = 0 or λ = T . Suppose now that the conditions of (ii)
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hold, but stationarity does not hold. We use the following definitions:
t∗ = sup{t ∈ [0, T ] ∶ ≽0 satisfies stationarity-before-t}
t∗ = inf{t ∈ [0, T ] ∶ ≽0 satisfies stationarity-after-t}
Two-stage stationarity demands that [0, T ] = [0, t∗] ∪ [t∗.T ]. By connectedness, if
the union of [0, t∗] and [t∗, T ] cover [0, T ], they must have a non-empty intersection.
We cannot have t∗ > t∗, or else stationarity would hold everywhere as argued above.
Then, there is a unique point in this intersection, t∗ = t∗ ∶= λ as required.
To complete the theorem when λ = 0 or λ = T , simply notice that the conditions
coincide with Theorem 2.1.1, except midpoint consistency being redundant. For the
remainder of the proof, we consider the λ ∈ (0, T ) case. We apply Observation 4.1 of
Bleichrodt, Kothiyal, Prelec and Wakker (2013) to derive a separable representation:
preferences are represented by a function that maps (x, t) to D(t)u(x), with D
continuous, strictly decreasing and positive with D(0) = 1, and u continuous and
strictly increasing.4 To determine the structure of D ∶ [0, T ] → R++ we consider its
behaviour on [0, λ] and [λ,T ] separately. As shown, preferences satisfy stationarity-
before-λ. Then, for t, s, t + s ⩽ λ and x,x′ ∈ [0,X] the following equivalence holds:(0, x) ∼ (t, x′) if and only if (s, x) ∼ (t + s, x′). The existence of suitable x and
x′ is straightforward. Substituting the separable representation we obtain: u(x) =
D(t)u(x′) if and only if D(s)u(x) = D(t + s)u(x′). Equivalently, D satisfies the
following local functional equation:
D(t + s) =D(t)D(s) t, s, t + s ∈ [0, λ].
This is the second of Cauchy’s functional equations, restricted to a connected subset
of the reals. The classic approach to solving this applies to the case where the
equation holds on all of R. One must show that there is an extension of D that
4What we call midpoint consistency is referred to as the hexagon condition, and as 1-unit
invariance in Bleichrodt, Kothiyal, Prelec and Wakker (2013).
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preserves the functional equation. This has been addressed by Aczel and Skof (2007),
whose results apply here as D is strictly positive. The general, continuous solution
gives D(t) = piαt for all t ∈ [0, λ] for non-zero α and pi. The initial condition, D(0) = 1,
gives pi = 1.
The existence of the separable representation of preferences, when combined with
stationarity-after-λ, will lead to a local functional equation on [λ,T ]. There is no
t ∈ [λ,T ] with D(t) = 1. Define a function D˜ such that D˜(t) = D(t)/D(λ) for
all t ∈ [λ,T ]. Notice that D˜(⋅)u(⋅) still represents preferences and that D˜(λ) = 1.
Stationarity-after-λ guarantees that, for t, s, t+s ⩾ λ and x,x′ ∈ [0,X], (λ,x) ∼ (t, x)
if and only if (λ + s, x) ∼ (t + s, x′). Substituting the rescaled representation gives:
D˜(t + s) = D˜(t)D˜(s) t, s, t + s ∈ [λ,T ]
The general, continuous solution is of the form D˜(t) = p˜iβt for all t ∈ [λ,T ], for non-
zero p˜i and β. That p˜i = β−λ follows immediately from the initial condition. Recall
that D =D(λ)D˜ on [λ,T ]. Summing up, we have shown that:
V0(x, t) =D(t)u(x) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩ α
tu(x) if t ⩽ λ(α/β)λβtu(x) if t > λ
as required. ∎
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2.2
Assume preferences admit a TSE discounting representation V0 ∶ [0,X] × [0, T ] → R
for some parameters α,β ∈ (0,1), λ ∈ [0, T ] and utility function u ∶ [0,X] → R. The
uniqueness of λ, when λ ∉ {0, T}, has been explained in the proof of Theorem 3.2.1
in Appendix A.1. Either λ is unique, or else stationarity must hold everywhere.
Since V0 represents preferences, it can be replaced by f ○ V0 whenever f is strictly
increasing. In general, such transformations need not retain the separable form.
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Suppose α is replaced with any α˜ ∈ (0,1) and utility u replaced with u˜ = uk
with k = ln(α˜)/ ln(α). One can verify that ln(αtu(x)) = (1/k) ln(α˜tu˜(x)) for all(x, t) ∈ [0,X]× [0, λ], and because ln is strictly increasing and k > 0, it must be that
preferences over [0,X] × [0, λ] are represented by α˜tu˜(x). Similarly, one may verify
that ln(βtu(x)) = (1/k) ln(βktu˜(x)) for all (x, t) ∈ [0,X] × [λ,T ], hence preferences
over [0,X] × [λ,T ] are represented by β˜tu˜(x) with β˜ = βk. By the same reasoning,
one may choose any β˜ ∈ (0,1), and proceed as above replacing u and α appropriately.
Once α and β are chosen, utility must be a ratio scale. This follows from well-known
results on separable representations, given that the location of utility is fixed. To see
this, recall that we included the condition (0, t) ∼t (0, t′), for any t, t′ ∈ [0, T ], in the
definition of impatience. Then u(0) = 0 holds, or else the representation would not
exhibit impatience.
Having chosen either of α or β, however, the other is uniquely determined. To see
this, one may take any x < y and find a unique t such that (x,0) ∼ (y, t). Choose x
and y such that t > λ. Substituting the representation and rearranging gives:
β = [ u(x)
αλu(y)]
1
t−λ
Given that u is a ratio scale, the right hand side of the above equation is dimension-
less. Therefore β, for given α (or vice versa), is uniquely determined. ∎
A.3 Proof of Theorem 4.1.1
First assume statement (iii) of the theorem holds. At each decision time, the static
preference relation admits a TSE discounting representation. By Theorem 3.2.1, the
initial preference is a continuous, monotonic, impatient and midpoint consistent weak
order that satisfies two-stage stationarity. The assumed dynamic model is such that,
each decision time’s representation is the restriction of the initial representation to
timed outcomes occurring no sooner than that decision time. At no time, therefore,
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can initial preferences be reversed. As such, the dynamic preference structure is time
consistent and statement (i) is proved.
We now assume the conditions of statement (i) and derive statement (iii). For t ∈ D ,
time consistency allows us to identify ≽t with ≽0∣Z where Z =X×[t, T ]; the restriction
of initial preferences ≽0 to the set of timed outcomes occurring no sooner than time
t. Hence, by Theorem 3.2.1, each ≽t may be represented by Vt ∶= V0∣Z as required.
Each decision time’s TSE discounting representation is the restriction of the initial
representation, hence every associated parameter (α,β, λ and u) is independent of
decision time.
To complete proof of Theorem 4.1.1, we now show the equivalence of statements
(i) and (ii). Fix a set of weakly ordered, monotonic, impatient, midpoint consis-
tent and continuous preference relations R. We prove that if R is time consistent
then, stationarity-before-t of ≽0 is equivalent to time-invariance-before-t of R. Let(x, t), (y, t′), (x, t − τ), (y, t′ − τ) ∈ [0,X] × [0, T ] with τ ⩾ 0 and t ⩾ t′. The following
diagram aids the proof of the theorem:
(x, t) ≽0 (y, t′) ⇒1 (x, t − τ) ≽0 (y, t′ − τ)
⇕2 ⇕3
(x, t) ≽t (y, t′) ⇒4 (x, t − τ) ≽t−τ (y, t′ − τ)
Note that implication 1 is stationarity-before-t, equivalences 2 and 3 are time consis-
tency, and implication 4 is time-invariance-before-t. Notice that implication 1 may
be deduced by starting at the top left preference, then 2, then 4, and then 3. Impli-
cation 4 may be deduced by starting with the bottom left preference, then 2, then 1,
and then 3. The equivalence of time consistency with stationarity-after-t, and time
consistency with time-invariance-after-t may be similarly shown. ∎
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A.4 Proof of Theorem 4.2.1
First assume statement (iii) of the theorem holds. At each decision time, the static
preference relation admits a TSE discounting representation. By the Theorem 3.2.1,
the initial preference is a continuous, monotonic, impatient and midpoint consistent
weak order that satisfies two-stage stationarity. The assumed dynamic model is such
that, each decision time t has a representation obtained by translating the initial
representation, and appropriately restricting it, as follows:
Vt(x, t) = V0(x, t − t) on [0,X] × [t, T ].
As such, initial preferences cannot be reversed when the timed outcomes and decision
time are all translated by a fixed amount. That is, the dynamic preference structure
is time invariant and statement (i) is proved.
We now assume the conditions of statement (i) and derive statement (iii). For t ∈ D ,
define ≽0,t according to:
(x, t) ≽0,t (x′, t′) ⇔ (x, t − t) ≽0 (x′, t′ − t)
for all (x, t), (x′, t′), (x, t − t), (x′, t′ − t) ∈ X × [0, T ]. By Theorem 3.2.1, ≽0 is repre-
sented by a TSE discounting function V0. Construct V˜t ∶ X × [t, T ] → R such that
V˜t(⋅, t) ≡ V0(⋅, t − t). Clearly, V˜t represents ≽0,t. Time invariance allows us to identify≽t with the restriction of ≽0,t to the set of timed outcomes occuring no sooner than
time t. Hence, ≽t may be represented by a function Vt ∶= V˜t∣Z where Z = X × [t, T ]
as required.
To complete the proof of Theorem 4.2.1, we show the equivalence of statements (i)
and (ii). Fix a set of weakly ordered, monotonic, impatient, midpoint consistent
and continuous preference relations R. We prove that if R is time invariant then,
stationarity-before-t of ≽0 is equivalent to time-consistency-within-t-from-now of R.
Let (x, t), (y, t′), (x, t − t), (y, t′ − t) ∈ [0,X] × [0, T ]. The following diagram contains
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the proof of this claim:
(x, t) ≽t (y, t′)⇗1(x, t) ≽0 (y, t′) ⇕3⇘2 (x, t − t) ≽0 (y, t′ − t)
Note that implication 1 is time-consistency-within-t-from-now, implication 2 is stationarity-
before-t and equivalence 3 is time invariance. We next show that, if R satisfies time
invariance, then stationarity-after-t of ≽0 and time-consistency-beyond-t-from-now of
R are equivalent. The following diagram contains the proof of this claim:
(x, t) ≽0 (y, t′) ⇘2⇕1 (x, t + t) ≽0 (y, t′ + t)⇗3(x, t + t) ≽t (y, t′ + t)
Note that equivalence 1 is time invariance, implication 2 is stationarity-after-t and
implication 3 is time-consistency-beyond-t-from-now. We have, therefore, established
that time invariance and two-stage stationarity are jointly equivalent, given the other
conditions, to time invariance and two-stage time consistency. ∎.
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